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hold formal hearings. Simply the knowledge that their activities are
under investigation would tend to deter the bulk of unwitting offenders
from further violations. The fear of formal administrative proceedings,
with their attendant publicity, and the possibility of eventual loss of mail
privileges should be sufficient to discourage the respectable businessman
from persisting in borderline activities. Should the individual decide to
risk an unfavorable outcome of the administrative hearing, he would do
so with the confidence that his rights are protected by the provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act.6" Whereas the hardened offenders
and fly-by-night operators are not likely to be impressed by the threat of
administrative action, the imminence of, and subjection to, criminal prose-
cution may alarm this breed of offender into terminating activities." It
would seem, therefore, that there is little to lose by denying the power
of the Postmaster General to summarily withhold the privilege of access
to the mails. The bulk of cases can be dealt with by pressures implicit in
formal hearing procedures. Close liaison between postal inspectors and
government prosecutors should lead to effective control of the criminal
residue.
Conclusion
Grave threats to personal rights are implicit in the power of an ad-
ministrative agency to apply summary sanctions. For this reason, they
should be employed reluctantly, and only in those situations where ex-
treme danger to the public urgently demands swift action. Whether the
activities against which postal sanctions have been summarily applied are
of this nature is a question for legislative or judicial decision. The present
use of these powers by the Post Office Department is without judicial
precedent or legislative authority. Clearly it is the duty of the courts to
declare such usurpation of authority illegal.
STATE SEDITION LAWS: THEIR SCOPE AND MISAPPLICATION
The criminal codes of thirty-one states, Hawaii, and Alaska' pro-
62. See note 16 supra.
63. See note 57 srapra.
1. ALA. CODE tit. 14, §§ 19-20 (1953); ALASKA ComP. LAWS ANN. §§ 65-11-1-65-
11-2 (1949) ; ARK. STAT. § 41-4107 (1947); COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 40 Art. 23 § 7 (1935) ;
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 8346-47 (1949) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 862 (1953) ; FLA. STAT.
§§ 779.05, 876.22-.31 (1953) ; GA. CODE § 26-901a (1953) ; HAWAII REV. LAWS § 11001
(1945) ; ILL. REV. STAT. c. 37, §§ 527-29 (1951); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-1302 (Burns
1933); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 689.4-.9 (1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 21.306 (1949) ; Ky.
REV. STAT. § 432.030 (1953); LA. REV. STAT. § 53:207 (1950); MD. ANN. CODE GEN.
NOTES
scribe sedition' regardless of the defendant's conviction or potential in-
dictment under a similar federal statute.3 An examination of the appli-
cation of state sedition acts' raises grave doubts as to whether the legis-
lation has been employed to punish conduct constituting something other
than sedition and whether the states are substantively, procedurally, and
administratively equipped to prosecute the crime.
Elastic and difficult to define,5 common law sedition evolved from
LAWS art. 85A, §§ 1-9 (1951); MICH. Com. LAWs §§ 750.545a-d, 752.311-13 (Supp.
1952) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 612.07-.09 (West 1947); MIss. CODE ANY. § 2402 (1942),§§ 4064-01-13 (Supp. 1954); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-4401 (1947); NEV. Com'.
LAWS §§ 10300-01 (1929); N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. LAWS c. 588 §§ 2-8 (1955); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:148-3 (1951); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-11-12 (1953); OHIO REV. CODE§§ 2921.21-2921.27 (1954) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4207 (1945) ; R. I. GEN. LAWS C.
604, §§ 1-4 (1938) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4405 (1955) ; TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 153(1948); VA. CODE § 18-352.1 (1950); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.05.150 (1951); W. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 5912-14 (1955).
2. Sedition, by its very nature, is unique among the crimes included in the general
area of subversion. The distinctive characteristic of the laws under discussion is that
they reach beyond acts and make criminal the utterance of words. It has long been ad-
vocated that punishment for language which affronts existing standards be left to more
subtle sanctions than prosecution and imprisonment. See CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE
UNITED STATES (1946) ; Mann, Security and the Constitution, Current History, October,
1955, 236; Prendergast, State Legislatures and Communism: The Current Scene, 44 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 556 (1950).
3. 54 STAT. 670 (1940), later amended by 62 STAT. 808 (1948) ; 18 U.S.C. § 2385(1952). The validity of the act on its face was upheld in Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494 (1951). The constitutionality of the entire act is once again before the Court
in Schneiderman v. United States, 106 F.Supp. 906 (S.D.Cal. 1952), aff'd sub nora.
Yates v. United States, 225 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. granted 24 U.S.L. WEEK 3101(Oct. 18, 1955). The constitutionality of that portion of the act making it criminal to
knowingly join or be a member of an organization which teaches and advocates the over-
throw of the government is in issue in United States v. Lightfoot, (N.D. Ill. 1955), ap-
peal docketed, No. 11470, 7th Cir., Sept. 19, 1955.
4. See GELLHORN, THE STATES AND SUBVERSION 394 (1952). Seventeen types of
state statutes are indexed: treason, rebellion and insurrection, sedition, criminal syndi-
calism, criminal anarchism, red flag laws, sabotage, masks and disguises, exclusion from
elective office, exclusion from public office, exclusion from state employment, registra-
tion statutes, teacher oaths, teacher loyalty other than oaths, miscellaneous school stat-
utes, exclusion from welfare benefits. See also FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC, DIGEST OF
PUBLIC RECORD OF COMMUNISMi IN THE UNITED STATES 241 (1955).
In addition the state sedition legislation has been discussed in CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH
IN THE UNITED STATES (1946) and EMERSON AND HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS
IN THE UNITED STATES (1952). See also Million, Political Crimes, 5 Mo. L. REV. 164,
293 (1940) ; Prendergast, State Legislatures and Communism: The Current Scene, 44
Air. POL. ScI. REV. 556 (1950) ; Groner, State Control of Subversive Activities in the
United States, 9 FED. B.A.J. 61 (1947) ; Hunt, Federal Supremacy and State Anti-Sub-
version Legislation, 53 MICH. L. REV. 407 (1955) ; Notes, 28 IND. L.J. 492 (1953) ; 61
HARV. L. Rv. 1215 (1948).
5. Although sedition as a crime was unknown to Rome, acts which later came to be
recognized as the offense were punished as treason by death. Rex v. Stroud, 3 St. Tr.
235, 270 (K.B. 1629).
"In the lay press we read that the learned judge had not adequately charged the jury
on the meaning or legal definition of the word 'sedition.' We can well understand his
difficulty. Even if he had had his law library with him, he would have found it difficult
to construct a definition which would have been consistent with all the charges andjudgments-and they are many-on the true significance of this debatable term." 191
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treason and criminal libel.' It was a misdemeanor,7 appearing more in
its adjective form than substantive,' that is, seditious libel,' seditious
words and rumors,1" and seditious conspiracies." Contrary to the pre-
cise constitutional straightjacketing of treason in the United States,12
LAW TIMES 31 (1941).
"Sedition consists in acts, words, or writings intended or calculated, in the circum-
stances of the time, to disturb the tranquility of the state, by creating ill-will, discontent,
disaffection, hatred, or contempt towards the person of the King, or towards the Con-
stitution or Parliament, or the Government, or the established institutions of the country,
or by exciting ill-will between different classes of the King's subjects, or encouraging
any class of them to endeavour to disobey, defy or subvert the laws or resist their ex-
ecution, or to create tumults or riots, or to do any act of violence or outrage or en-
dangering the public peace." RUSSELL, ON CRIME 139 (10th ed. 1950). "Sedition . . .
embraces everything, which by word, deed, or writing, is calculated to disturb the tran-
quility of the state, and lead ignorant persons to endeavour to subvert the government
and laws of the empire." Regina v. Burns, 16 Cox. C.C. 355, 360 (K.B. 1886). See also
CHAFEE, op. cit. szpra note 4, at 497; Rex v. Stroud, supra.
6. Truth of the statements made, at common law, was not a defense. Rex v. Bur-
dett, 1 St. Tr. (n.s.) 1, 153-54 (K.B. 1820) ; Regina v. Duffy, 2 Cox C.C. 45, 49 (Q.B.
1846). This seems to be a facet inherited from criminal libel. Bona-fide belief in the
truth of the matter stated, however, might be used in mitigation. Rex v. Burdett, suepra
at 159. Prior to Fox's Libel Act, 1792, 32 GEO. 3, c. 60, the court decided the all-
important question of whether the material in question was "seditious" while the jury
was relegated to the role of determining whether the defendant had actually written,
printed, or published the material. After 1792, the jury was permitted to return a
general verdict on the defendant's guilt or innocence.
7. Rex v. Stroud, 3 St. Tr. 235 (1629).
8. Sir James Stephen doubted whether there was such a crime as sedition except as
used in its adjective form. STEPHEN'S DIGEST OF CRIMINAL LAw 92 (7th ed. 1926).
Rex v. Stroud, 3 St. Tr. 235, 267 (K.B. 1629).
9. 32 GEO. 3, c. 60 (1792). Rex. v. McHugh, 2 Ir. R. 587 (1901) ; Regina v. Sul-
livan, 11 Cox C.C. 44 (1868) ; Rex v. Harvey, 2 B. & C. 257, 107 E.R. 379 (K.B. 1823) ;
Rex v. Lambert, 2 Camp. 398, 170 E.R. 1196 (1810) ; Rex v. Cobbett, 29 St. Tr. 1(K.B. 1804) ; Rex v. Frost, 22 St. Tr. 471 (1793) ; Rex v. Horne, 20 St. Tr. 651 (K.B.
1778) ; Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 98 E.R. 327 (1769) ; Rex v. Matthews, 15 St. Tr.
1323 (1719) ; Regina v. Tuchin, 14 St. Tr. 1095 (1704).
10. 23 ELIz., c. 2 (1581).
11. 3 & 4 EDw. 6, c. 5 (1549). O'onnell v. Regina, 11 Cl. & Fin. 155, 8 E.R. 1061(1844) ; Regina v. Cooper, 4 St. Tr. (n.s.) 1249 (Q.B. 1843) ; Regina v. O'Conner, 4
St. Tr. (n.s.) 935 (Q.B. 1843) ; Regina v. Holberry, 4 St. Tr. (n.s.) 1347 (1840) ; Rex
v. Hunt, 1 St. Tr. (n.s.) 171 (K.B. 1820).
12. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. "Treason against the United States, shall consist
only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid or
comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on testimony of two witnesses
to the same overt act, or on confession in open court."
"However flagitious may be the crime of conspiring to subvert by force the govern-
ment of our country, such conspiracy is not treason." Marshall, C. J., in Ex parte Boll-
man, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 75, 126 (1807). Marshall further recalled the fear of the common
law doctrine of constructive treason. "[T]he framers of our constitution . . . must
have conceived it more safe that punishment in such cases should be ordained by general
laws, formed upon deliberation, under the influence of no resentments, and without
knowing on whom they were to operate, than that it should be inflicted under the in-
fluence of those passions which the occasion seldom fails to excite, and which a flexible
definition of the crime, or a construction which would render it flexible, might bring
into operation." Id. at 127.
NOTES
conduct constituting advocacy of overthrow of the Crown ' or encom-
passing the death of the King 4 was considered treason.'
Similarity between English and American sedition is found only in
instigation of contempt and disaffection. Sedition in America"0 generally
consists of advocacy by word, publication, or otherwise of the overthrow
of the existing government by force and violence or inciting discontent
and contempt for that government. As proof of advocacy is sufficient
to satisfy the conduct element of sedition, it may be distinguished from
treason, insurrection, rebellion, and sabotage which require overt acts
aimed at the accomplishment of the prohibited ends. Sedition is also dis-
tinguishable from criminal syndicalism,"7 which is advocacy of destruction
and overthrow of industrial ownership, and criminal anarchism, 8 which
decries government as a political theory rather than a particular sover-
eign. These differences have been overlooked, however, by state legis-
latures 9 and courts, and sedition seems to have become merged with
13. Rex v. Home Tooke, 25 St. Tr. 1 (1794) (conspiracy to depose King) ; Rex v.
Darrell, 10 Mod. .321, 88 Eng. Rep. 747 (K.B. 1715) (intent to depose King); Rex v.
Cook, 13 St. Tr. 311 (1696) (inviting invasion from France); Regina v. Blunt, 1 St.
Tr. 1409 (1600) (design to deprive Queen of her crown). For a discussion as to
whether speaking of words advocating such acts was treason, see Rex v. Despard, 28 St.
Tr. 346, 347 (1803).
14. Regina v. Francis, 4 St. Tr. (n.s.) 1376 (1842); Rex v. Hardy, 1 East P.C.
60 (K.B. 1794) ; Rex v. Vane, 84 Eng. Rep. 1060 (K.B. 1662) ; Rex v. McGuire, 4 St.
Tr. 653 (1645). See Black, Imnagining the Ifing's Death, 30 LAw NOTES (N.Y.) 148
(1926).
15. As to the distinction between high treason and sedition, see 1 East P.C. 48, 22
St. Tr. 477 (1793).
16. GELLHORN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 397. Advocacy of overthrow has been
added. See note 5 supra. For sedition's general American history see authorities cited
in note 4 supra.
17. See, e.g., IOwA CODE ANN. § 689.10-13 (1951). See Burns v. United States,
274 U.S. 328 (1927) (upholding constitutionality of California statute) ; Fiske v. Kan-
sas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (invalidating application of Kansas statute as violative of
fourteenth amendment) ; State v. Lowery, 104 Wash. 520, 177 Pac. 355 (1918) ; State
v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 191 N.W. 530 (1923); case collections in 21 A.L.R. 1543 (1922),
73 A.L.R. 1498 (1930) ; Note, 36 ILL. L. REv. 357 (1941). Eighteen states, Alaska, and
Hawaii proscribe the crime by statute. FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC, op. cit. supra note 4,
at 296.
18. See, e.g., N.Y. PEN. LAw, § 160 (1902). This is the act under which Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) was originally prosecuted. See State v. Scott, 86
N.J.L. 133, 90 Ati. 235 (1914) ; People v. Larkin, 234 N.Y. 530, 138 N.E. 434 (1922).
Nineteen states and Alaska proscribe the crime by statute. FUND FOR THE REPUBaIC, op.
cit. supra note 4, at 289.
Note that Gitlow, a Communist, was convicted for anarchism, an ideology com-
pletely incompatible with Communism. See Pound, joined by Cardozo, dissenting, 234
N.Y. 132, 154, 136 N.E. 317, 326 (1922).
19. CoLo. STAT. ANN. c. 48, § 48 (1935) (combines anarchy and sedition) ; CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 8346 (1949) (combines anarchy and sedition) ; HAWAII REv. LAws, c. 236,
§11001 (1945) (makes unlawful publication of material advocating ". . . sabotage, in-
cendiarism, sedition, anarchy. . . .") ; R.L GEN. LAws, c. 604, §§ 1-4 (1938) (combine
sedition, criminal syndicalism, and criminal anarchism).
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syndicalism and anarchism. Prosecutions of anarchists, Socialists, I.W.W.
members, Communists, and other non-conformists have been maintained
indiscriminately under statutes proscribing one or any combination of
these crimes.
At common law, the paramount element has long been a specific
intent" to bring about contempt and disaffection for the government
rather than mere publication of inflammatory material which might
amount to a breach of the peace. This element has been generally absent
in state prosecutions ;21 only nine of the thirty-one sedition statutes con-
tain any reference to the defendant's state of mind.2' Although a specific
intent has been recognized in recent federal prosecutions, 2 the require-
20. As outlined by Stephen: ". . . a seditious intention is an intention to bring
into hatred or contempt, or to incite disaffection against the person of Her Majesty, her
heirs or successors, or the government or constitution of the United Kingdom, as by law
established or either House of Parliament, or the administration of justice, or to excite
Her Majesty's subjects to attempt otherwise than by lawful means the alteration of
Church or State by law established, or to raise discontent or dissaffection among Her
Majesty's subjects, or to promote feelings of ill will and hostility between different
classes of such subjects." STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 8, at § 114. Regina v. Burns, 16
Cox C.C. 355 (1886) is generally considered the outstanding recitation of the 19th and
20th century English law of sedition. RUSSELL, ON CRIME 140 (10th ed. 1950) ; CHAFEE,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 505.
Justice Cave, in the Burns case, after proclaiming what constituted a seditious in-
tention, added this important qualification: "An intention to show that Her Majesty
has been misled or mistaken in her measures, or to point out errors or defects in the
government or constitution, as by law established, with a view to their reformation, or
to excite Her Majesty's subjects to attempt by lawful means the alteration of any matter
in church or State by laws established, or to point out, in order to their removal, mat-
ters which are producing or have a tendency to produce, feelings of hatred and ill will
between classes of Her Majesty's subjects, is not a seditious intention." Regina v.
Burns, szupra at 360.
21. Several state courts have rejected defendant's contentions that intent was an
essential element of the crime. "The legislature may, as a general rule, penalize the
doing of an act without regard to the intent or knowledge of the doer .... ." State v.
Loundy, 103 Or. 443, 499, 204 Pac. 958, 976 (1922). "[T]he legislature had the power
to provide that any person who joins an organization organized for unlawful purposes,
whether such person is or is not aware of the unlawful purpose, is guilty of an offense."
People v. McClennegan, 195 Cal. 445, 468, 234 Pac. 91, 100 (1925).
22. Maryland's Ober Law and statutes patterned after it in Florida, Georgia, Michi-
gan, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Washington require the defendant to act "knowingly
and wilfully." Indiana's act states: "It shall be unlawful to advocate . . . or with
intent to forward such purpose, to print . . . any document . . . by which there is ad-
vocated . . . the overthrow, by force and violence, of the government of the United
States .... ." Pennsylvania's statute proscribes conduct ". . . the intent of which is
. . . to encourage any person to engage in any conduct with a view of overthrowing ...
the government." See statutes cited note 1 supra.
23. "The existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the
principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence. . . . [A]n intent to overthrow
the Govrenment of the United States by advocacy thereof is . . . susceptible of proof."
Vinson, C. J., in Dennis v. United States 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951). Judge Medina, in
instructing the jury in the Dennis case, stated: "[I]t is not the abstract doctrine of
overthrowing and destroying organiced government by unlawful incans which is de-
nounced by this law. . . . You cannot find the defendants or any of them guilty of the
crime charged unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that they conspired to
NOTES
ment in cases brought under the state laws, with few exceptions,24 seems
to be only the intent to publish the material held as seditious or to bring
the government into hatred or contempt without proof of an intent to
commit the far more substantial crime of advocating the overthrow of
the United States government by force and violence. In light of the
severe sentences meted out under the statutes, the states appear to be
punishing what at common law was treason while requiring proof of a
far less serious crime. 5
Historically, sedition has been invoked to stifle political opposition.
In 1798,21 the Federalist-controlled Congress enacted the first Alien and
Sedition Act plainly aimed at growing Jeffersonian power. The defend-
ants, generally influential Republican editors and politicians, were im-
prisoned for words considered mild-to-average in modern-day political
attacks." Under the misnamed Espionage Acts of 19172' and 191829 and
organize a society, group and assembly of persons who teach and advocate the over-
throw of the Government of the United States by force and violence and to advocate
and teach the duty and necessity of overthrowing or destroying the Government of the
United States by force and violence, with the intent that such teaching and advocacy be
of a rule or principle of action and by language reasonably and ordinarily calculated to
incite persons to such action, all with the intent to cause the overthrow or destrtction of
the Govennment of the United States by force and violence as speedily as circumstances
woidd permit." United States v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd sub
nom. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). (Emphasis added.)
24. Gerdes v. State, 104 Neb. 35, 175 N.W. 606 (1919). Defendant refused to buy
Liberty Bonds and cursed local subscription committee. Conviction for sedition reversed
because of no proof of intent.
25. State v. Boloff, 138 Ore. 568, 4 P.2d 326 (1931). Defendant was an un-
employed sewer digger arrested for vagrancy. Police found a Communist Party mem-
bership card in his possession. He was convicted and sentenced to 10 years in prison.
See Belt, J., dissenting. Id. at 653, 4 P.2d at 340. See note 78 infra.
26. 1 STAT. 596 (1798). The act made it a federal offense to make false, scan-
dalous, and malicious criticism of the President, Congress, of the government of the
United States with intent to defame the government or to bring the officials into dis-
repute or to incite against them the hatred of the people or to encourage resistance to
the law.
27. The act came close to precipitating civil war. Secession was threatened by
Jefferson in the Virginia-Kentucky Resolutions. See COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 178-183 (1948). The four trials fully reported are United States v.
Lyon, Wharton's St. Tr. 333 (1798); United States v. Haswell, Wharton's St. Tr. 684
(1800) ; United States v. Cooper, Wharton's St. Tr. 659 (1800); United States v.
Callender, Wharton's St. Tr. 688 (1800). The act is generally considered a major fac-
tor in the Federalist defeat of 1800. It expired in 1801 and Jefferson pardoned all those
convicted thereunder. Congress eventually repaid most of the fines. EMERSON AND
HABER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 367; CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 507.
28. 40 STAT. 217 (1917), repealed by 62 STAT. 862 (1948). The act had little to do
with espionage. It made criminal obstruction of enlistment or causing insubordination,
disloyalty, or mutiny in the armed forces.
29. 40 STAT. 533 (1918), repealed by 41 STAT. 1359-60 (1921). See 60 CONG. REC.
293-94, 4207-08 (1921). This amendment to the previous year's act was actually a legis-
lative snowball. Asked by Attorney General Gregory for a brief amendment to stop at-
tempts to obstruct recruiting and war loan drives, the Senate Judiciary Committee in-
serted, almost in its entirety, a sweeping Montana sedition act (Mont. Laws, 1918, Ex.
275
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the 2,00Q prosecutions brought under them,3" it became criminal to advo-
cate higher taxes instead of bond issues, to state that the draft was
unconstitutional though the Supreme Court had not yet held it valid, to
say the sinking of merchant vessels was legal, to urge that a referendum
should have preceded declaration of war, or to urge that the war was
contrary to the teachings of Christ.3
Responding to world tension and real dangers of foreign-dominated
subversive organizations, the federal government re-entered the field in
1940 with the Smith Act,32 an almost word-for-word reprint of the 1902
New York anarchy statute,33 which punishes the teaching or advocacy of
violent overthrow of the United States government or of any state or
local government.34  Invoked but once in its first eight years,3"- the act
was later employed in prosecutions of top level communist leaders" and
now is supplemented by other federal anti-subversion statutes including
the Internal Security Act of 1950"7 and the Communist Control Act of
1954.38
Ses., c. 11, p. 28). See note 46 infra. The statute's successor is MONT. REV. CODE ANx.
§ 94-4401 (1947).
30. The six most important cases which reached the Supreme Court include
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) ; Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204
(1919) ; Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) ; Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616 (1919) ; Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920) ; Pierce v. United States,
252 U.S. 239 (1920). The Abrams case marked the beginning of the long line of first
and fourteenth amendment dissents of Justices Brandeis and Holmes. For discussions
of the acts and prosecutions, see CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 4, 36-140; E-mERSON AND
HABER, op. cit. supra note 4, 347-383. For a less impassioned and, perhaps, more objec-
tive approach to the period, see Hall, Free Speech in Wartime, 21 COLU-IB. L. REv. 526
(1921). As to the corresponding period in England, see Note, 31 HaRV. L. REV. 296
(1917).
31. See generally, United States v. Krafft, 249 Fed. 919 (3d Cir. 1918) ; United
States v. Kirchner, 255 Fed. 301 (4th Cir. 1918) ; Granzow v. United States, 261 Fed.
172 (8th Cir. 1919) ; Shaffer v. United States, 255 Fed. 886 (9th Cir. 1919) ; Sandberg
v. United States, 257 Fed. 643 (9th Cir. 1919) ; Albers v. United States, 263 Fed. 27 (9th
Cir. 1920) ; White v. United States, 263 Fed. 17 (6th Cir. 1920) ; United States v.
Boutin, 251 Fed. 313 (N.D.N.Y. 1918); United States v. Nagler, 252 Fed. 217 (W.D.
Wis. 1918).
32. 54 STAT. 670 (1940), later amended by 62 STAT. 808 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 2385
(1952). See I-iearings Before the Senate Judiciary Committee on H.R. 5138, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess., 5-12 (1940) ; 86 CONG. REc. 9031-32 (1940) ; 84 CONG. REc. 10452 (1939).
33. See note 42 infra.
34. The 1948 revision outlawed the attempted overthrow of "the government of the
United States, or the government of any State, Territory, District, or Possession there-
of. . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1952). The wording had been ". . . any government in
the United States." 54 STAT. 670 (1940). The change does not appear to be one of
substance.
35. Dunne v. United States, 138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S.
790 (1943).
36. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Of the 105 Communists in-
dicted under provisions of the act to March 23, 1954, 67 had been convicted. FUND FOR
THE REPUBLIC, op. cit. supra note 4, at 202.
37. 64 STAT. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-98 (Supp. 1952).
38. 68 STAT. 775 (1954), Pub. L. No. 337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 24, 1954).
NOTES
With the exception of pre-Civil War statutes passed by the southern
states in a frantic effort to halt the spreading abolitionist movement,30
sedition on a state level was virtually unmentioned in the nineteenth cen-
tury.4" It remained for the growing struggle between industrial expan-
sion and the rising force of labor to set the stage for the crime's modern
period. The Haymarket bombing in 188741 and the assassination of
President McKinley in 1901 prompted a movement against adverse po-
litical thought which has not yet ended. Shortly after the latter event,
New York passed its Criminal Anarchy Act,4 2 generally considered the
forerunner of most anti-subversion legislation.43 Legislatures during and
after World War I enacted statutes condemning sedition, anarchy, and
syndicalism,44 and several states, particularly Minnesota, 3 Montana,46 and
39. Georgia proscribed, subject to the death penalty, "aiding or assisting in the
circulation or bringing into this state . . . any . . . pamphlet, paper or circular, for
the purposes of exciting to insurrection, conspiracy or resistance among the slaves, ne-
groes, or free persons of colour. . . ." Ga. L. 1829, p. 170, sec. 10.
40. Excepting the civil war period, the only reported case is Respublica v. Dennie,
4 Pa. 266 (1805). Defendant was found not guilty of sedition for writing, "A democ-
racy is scarcely tolerable at any period of national history. . .. No wise man but
discerns its imperfections, no good man but shudders at its miseries, no honest man but
proclaims its fraud, no brave man but draws his sword against its force." Id. at 268.
The jury was instructed that ". . . if the publication was seditiously, maliciously, and
wilfully aimed at the independence of the United States, or the constitution thereof or
of this state . . ." they should convict, but if it ". . . was honestly meant to inform
the public mind, and warn them against supposed dangers in society . . ." they should
acquit. Id. at 270.
41. Eight anarchists were convicted of murder for the deaths of eight policemen
killed when a bomb was thrown during a meeting of labor sympathizers. One of the
convicted men committed suicide and three were hanged. Those remaining were par-
doned three years later. Spies v. People, 122 Ill. 1, 12 N.W. 865, aff'd, 123 U.S. 131
(1887). See Zeisler, Reminiscences of the Anarchist Case, 21 ILL. L. RIv. 224 (1926).
42. Laws of 1902, c. 371; N.Y. PEN. LAW, §§ 160-161. See note 33 supra.
43. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 347.14 (1953), passed in 1903 and patterned on the New
York act.
44. Anti-subversion legislation has been passed by the states in four different
periods. The first came after the events discussed in the text above; the second imme-
diately after World War I; a third during the Depression; and a fourth after World
War II.
45. State v. Holm, 139 Minn. 267, 166 N.W. 181 (1918); State v. Moilen, 140
Minn. 112, 167 N.W. 345 (1918); State v. Spartz, 140 Minn. 203, 167 N.W. 547 (1918);
State v. Freerks, 140 Minn. 349, 168 N.W. 23 (1918) ; State v. Townley, 140 Minn. 413,
168 N.W. 591 (1918) ; State v. Kaercher, 141 Minn. 186, 169 N.W. 699 (1918) ; State
v. Hartung, 147 Minn. 128, 179 N.W. 646 (1920).
The target of these prosecutions was the radical Non-Partisan League. The actions
were typical of the hysterical prosecution of a minority group which had, even if the
intention could be shown, not the slightest chance of effecting the overthrow of any
government. Not only did the prosecutions further unfair and harsh treatment of
German-American farmers, most of whom were guilty only of being of German ances-
try, but they seriously impaired the war effort. See O'Brian, Civil Liberty in War Time,
42 PRoc. N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N 275 (1919).
The statute under which these cases were brought (Minn. Laws 1917, c. 463) was
upheld in Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920). Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent on
first and fourteenth amendment grounds is the first square argument by a mem-
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California,4" instituted stringent enforcement.
Prosecutions subsided during the prosperity years of the late 1920's4"
but were renewed with vigor, during the depression and strike-infested
years which followed, to combat labor's growing pains rather than any
imminent or remote threat of the overthrow of any government.49
The states base their jurisdiction over the crime of sedition on the
theory that any attempt to destroy the United States also imperils the
states' sovereignty." They will so argue, joined by the United States
Solicitor General, 5 in Commonwealth v. Nelson,S presently before the
ber of the Court that freedom of speech is protected from state infringement. Id. at 334.
For the speech which resulted in Gilbert's indictment and conviction, see CHAFEE, Op. Cit.
supra note 4, at 289. For a unanimous reversal of conviction for comparable language
as violative of due process, see Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927). See also Warren,
The New Liberty Under the 14th Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REv. 431 (1926) ; Green,
Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 27 WASH. U. L. Q. 497 (1942) ; Note, 14
VA. L. REv. 49 (1927).
46. State v. Kahn, 56 Mont. 108, 182 Pac. 107 (1919) ; State v. Griffith, 56 Mont.
241, 184 Pac. 219 (1919) ; State v. Wyman, 56 Mont. 600, 186 Pac. 1 (1919) ; State v.
Smith, 57 Mont. 563, 190 Pac. 107 (1920) ; State v. Diedtman, 58 Mont. 13, 190 Pac. 117
(1920) ; State v. Fowler, 59 Mont. 346, 196 Pac. 992 (1921). Convictions were generally
of I.W.W. members under Mont. Laws 1918, Ex. Sess., c. 11, p. 28.
47. California prosecuted radicals of all types for the crime of criminal syndical-
ism (CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 11400-02 (1949), having no sedition or anarchy statutes. Peo-
ple v. Welton, 190 Cal. 236, 211 Pac. 802 (1922) ; People v. McClennegen, 195 Cal. 445,
234 Pac. 91 (1925) ; People v. Malley, 49 Cal. App. 597, 194 Pac. 48 (1920) ; People v.
Lesse, 52 Cal. App. 280, 199 Pac. 46 (1921); People v. Eaton, 60 Cal. App. 612, 213
Pac. 275 (1923) ; People v. Thurman, 62 Cal. App. 147, 216 Pac. 394 (1923).
The statute was upheld in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). Justice
Brandeis, however, concurred specially, joined by Justice Holmes, saying constitutional
issues had not been sufficiently raised at the trial to bring them before the Supreme
Court's limited jurisdiction to review state convictions. Id. at 372. See Burns v. United
States, 274 U.S. 328 (1927).
Between 1919 and 1924, 511 persons were indicted. Of these, 264 were tried. One
hundred were freed, 31 by acquital, 69 by hung juries. Of 164 convicted, 23 received
suspended sentences and 128 received prison sentences ranging from one to fourteen
years. One hundred fourteen appealed and 55 convictions were reversed. Note, 19 CAL.
L. REv. 64, 65-66 (1930).
48. Only three reported cases may be found between 1925 and 1930. Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (conviction reversed) ; Gregory v. Commonwealth, 226
Ky. 617, 11 S.W.2d 432 (1928) (conviction reversed) ; Commonwealth v. Widovich, 295
Pa. 311, 145 Atl. 295 (1929).
49. See, e.g., State v. Boloff, 138 Ore. 568, 4 P.2d 326 (1931). Defendant received
a 10-year sentence. At the rehearing, the court stated: "The party [Communist] pro-
gram, more than the defendant, is on trial." 138 Ore. 610, 632, 7 P.2d 775, 783 (1931).
50. Brief of the State of New Hampshire as Amicus Curiae, p. 4, Commonwealth
v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 58, 104 A.2d 133 (1954), cert. granted, 348 U.S. 814 (1955). New
Hampshire was joined in the brief by 24 states: Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin.
51. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Commonwealth v. Nelson, supra
note 50.
52. 377 Pa. 58, 104 A.2d 133 (1954), cert. granIted, 348 U.S. 814 (1955). For case
comment see 18 U. OF DETROIT L. REv. 231 (1955) ; 39 MINN. L. REV. 211 (1955) ; 40
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United States Supreme Court. Pennsylvania's highest court invalidated
the application of that state's sedition act" by reversing the conviction of
Steve Nelson,"' long-time communist leader, also convicted of conspiring
to violate the Smith Act.55 Arguing that federal statutes had superseded
and suspended the state law," the court relied heavily on Hines v. David-
owit'1 in which it was ruled that the Federal Alien Registration Act 8
superseded similar state statutes.59 The state court rejected Gilbert v.
CORNELL L. Q. 130 (1954); 29 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 1293 (1954); 34 B.U.L. Rv. 514
(1955); 102 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 1089 (1954).
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4207 (1945).
54. Nelson is one of the few ranking Communists ever tried by a state. An ad-
mitted member of the party's National Committee, Nelson was also mentioned in con-
nection with the theft of atomic secrets from the University of California. House Com-
mittee on Un-American Activities, Report on Soviet.Espionage in Connection with the
Atom Bomb, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1948). When asked by a Congressional investigator
to which side he would owe his allegiance in the event of war between the United States
and Russia, Nelson pleaded the fifth amendment. House Committee on Un-American
Activities, Hearings Regarding Steve Nelson, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). He was
described as "atom bomb spy" by Justice Musmanno in Clarke v. Meade, 377 Pa. 150,
204, 104 A.2d 465, 476 (1954).
55. United States v. Mesarosh, 116 F.Supp. 345 (W.D. Pa. 1953), cert. granted, 24
U.S.L. WEEK 3164 (Dec. 13, 1955). Nelson, alias Steve Mesarosh, received a 5-year
sentence here as opposed to 20 years, $10,000 fine, and payment of $13,000 costs in the
state action. By the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in this case, Nelson assumes
the unusual position of having both state and federal convictions before the Court si-
multaneously.
56. State courts have in the past universally rejected the same argument. State v.
McKee, 73 Conn. 18, 46 Atl. 409 (1900); People v. Most, 171 N.Y. 423, 64 N.E. 175
(1902) ; State v. Holm, 139 Minn. 267, 166 N.W. 181 (1918) ; State v. Kahn, 56 Mont.
108, 182 Pac. 107 (1919) ; State v. Tachin, 92 N.J.L. 269, 106 At. 145 (1919) ; People v.
Steelik, 187 Cal. 361, 203 Pac. 78 (1921) ; State v. Hennessy, 114 Wash. 351, 195 Pac.
211 (1921) ; People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23, 136 N.E. 505 (1922) ; Commonwealth v. Lazar,
103 Pa. Super. 417, 157 Atl. 701 (1931) ; Barton v. City of Bessemer, 234 Ala. 20, 173
So. 626 (1937). The Nelson case was expressly challenged in Nelson v. Wyman,
N.H. - , 105 A.2d 756 (1955). See Albertson v. Millard, 106 F.Supp. 635, 641 (E.D.
Mich. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 345 U.S. 242 (1953). For the Supreme Court's
relative tolerance in regard to other types of anti-subversion statutes, see Garner v.
Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) (affirmed discharge of
municipal employees for failure to take loyalty oath) ; Gerende v. Board of Supervisors,
341 U.S. 56 (1951) (approved constitutionality of Maryland statute requiring candidate
for public office to execute non-subversion affidavit) ; Adler v. Board of Education, 342
U.S. 485 (1952) (upheld New York statute disqualifying subversives from teaching in
schools).
57. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
58. 54 STAT. 673 (1940), as amended 66 STAT. 223 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1301-06
(Supp. 1952).
59. Instances of implied supersession may be separated into four classifications:
a) Cases in which the scheme of federal legislation is so pervasive as to make rea-
sonable the inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it. Penn-
sylvania R.R. v. P.S.C., 250 U.S. 566 (1919).
b) The act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so domi-
nant that the federal system may be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on
the same subject. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
c) The object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of the
obligation imposed by it reveal the same purpose as the state law. Napier v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926); New York Central R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S.
279
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Minnesota, ° the leading case of state-prosecution advocates, distinguish-
ing the Minnesota statute in question as a local police measure." Thus
the fate of state sedition laws, and by implication the future of more
than 300 other state laws concerning subversion,62 would seem to turn
on the issue of supersession rather than the considerations raised hereto-
fore in this discussion.
Since English history affords no parallel to the federal system, a
decision on whether the states should have a voice in punishing sedition
will necessarily come solely from American experience. Sedition, how-
ever, has long been considered a crime against the sovereign, which in
the case of the United States is the national government. Although the
states generally proscribe sedition against "this state or the United
States,"63 nowhere on record can be found a conviction for advocacy of
the overthrow of an individual state. Federal prosecution advocates also
contend that the "world movement"6 form of the communist conspiracy
takes it outside the scope of state power 5 since the Federal Constitution
charges the national government with, the duty of guaranteeing "to every
state in this union a Republican form of government."6
No state can successfully argue that it is a completely independent
sovereign or that its safety, or very being, does not depend on the security
of the national government. Certainly the communist conspiracy is not
aimed at any individual state; it is difficult to imagine an internal as-
147 (1917).
d) The state policy may produce a result inconsistent with the object of the federal
statute. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
It is submitted, however, that the supersession holding of the Pennsylvania court is
inconsistent with Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin E. Rel. Bd., 315 U.S. 740,
749. "[T]his Court has long insisted that an intention of Congress to exclude states
from exerting their police power must be clearly manifested." No such clear manifesta-
tion may be found, especially in light of a letter from Congressman Smith, the bill's
sponsor, reprinted in Commonwealth v. Nelson, 277 Pa. 58, 90, 104 A.2d 133, 142 (1954)
(dissenting opinion). See also H.R. Rep. No. 2980, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 25-46 (1950).
As to supersession generally, see Hunt, Federal Supremacy and State Anti-Subvdersion
Legislation, 53 MIcH. L. REV. 407 (1955) ; Notes, 60 HARV. L. REV. 262 (1946) ; 66
HARV. L. REV. 327 (1952); 55 COLUm. L. REV. 83 (1955).
60. 252 U.S. 325 (1920).
61. Commonwealth v. Nelson, 277 Pa. 58, 72, 104 A.2d 133, 140 (1954).
62. See note 4 supra.
63. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4207 (1945).
64. See CONGRESSIONAL FINDING OF NECESSITY, 64 STAT. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §
781 (Supp. 1952).
65. At least 22 municipalities have also entered the subversion field. Atlanta, Ga.,
Terre Haute, Ind., and Bessemer, Ala., have ordinances proscribing sedition similar to
those discussed herein, save for less stringent sanctions. The latter law's constitutional-
ity was upheld in Barton v. City of Bessemer, 234 Ala. 20, 173 So. 626 (1936). See
Sutherland, Freedom and Internal Security, 64 HARv. L. REV. 383, 388 (1951) ; FuND
FOR THE REPUBLIC, op. cit. supra note 4, at 455.
66. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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sumption of power by a group emanating from a single state.67
The states contend that invalidating the application of their sedition
laws would deprive them of power to quell uprisings before they begin,6"
despite the fact that each has a complete set of statutes covering public
disorders and riots.6 9 It is submitted that if the conduct which the states
have previously punished as sedition amounts to no more than a criminal
breach of the peace, such conduct should be left to statutes proscribing it.
If, on the other hand, the states have punished real sedition, it seems they
have intruded in a federal matter and should limit their control of sub-
version to statutes covering state issues such as education" and welfare."'
In addition to the pre-emption issue raised by the Nelson case,
72
several other arguments against state sedition prosecutions may be pre-
sented. Coupled with the lack of any statutory intent requirement is an
almost uniform absence of any consideration as to the amount of danger
created by the defendant's conduct.73 Such a consideration was originally
presented by Mr. Justice Holmes' "clear and present danger" test in
67. The states have long been barred from punishing treason against the United
States. Ex parte Quarrier, 2 W. Va. 569 (1866). If the most generally quoted defini-
tion of sedition, advocacy of overthrow, is to be accepted, it would seem that sedition
and treason may be distinguished only in that one requires an overt act while the other
does not and that, if states are barred from prosecuting treason against the United
States, they should be similarly precluded from punishing sedition aganist that govern-
ment.
68. See note 50 supra at 21.
69. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 4401 (riots, routs, assemblies, affrays) ; §
4406 (disorderly conduct) ; § 4416 (carrying deadly weapons) ; § 4417 (carrying bombs
and explosives). See Commonwealth v. Nelson, 277 Pa. 58, 70, 104 A.2d 133, 139 (1954).
70. A state-by-state listing of laws concerning subversion as related to education
may be found in FUND FOR THE- REPUBLIC, Op. cit. supra note 4, at 427. N.Y. EDUCATION
LAWv § 3204 and W. VA. CODE c. 18, § 1734 (1955) provide for courses in every school
in citizenship, civics, and American history. Positive legislation of this type concerned.
with educating the youthful liberal rather than punishing the adult Communist seems to
be better means of avoiding subversion.
71. Id. at 410.
72. 277 Pa. 58, 104 A.2d 133 (1954), cert. granted 348 U.S. 814 (1955).
73. The early decisions under the syndicalism and sedition statutes, based on the
premise that government could properly regulate attempts at its forceful overthrow, held
that the conduct might be proscribed if it had a "reasonable tendency" to promote vio-
lence. See, e.g., People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23, 136 N.E. 505 (1922) ; Commonwealth v.
Lazar, 103 Pa. Super. 417, 157 Atl. 701 (1931). For cases showing reversal for failure
to instruct jury on clear and present danger, see Shaw v. State, 76 Okla. Crim. 271, 134
P.2d 999 (1943) ; Wood v. State, 77 Okla. Crim. 305, 141 P.2d 309 (1943). "However
reprehensible a Legislature may regard certain convictions or affiliations, it cannot for-
bid them if they present no 'clear and present danger that they will bring about the sub-
stantive evils' that the Legislature has a right to prevent." Danskin v. San Diego Uni-
fied School District, 28 Cal.2d 536, 542, 171 P.2d 885, 889 (1946). Contra, State v. Kas-
say, 126 Ohio St. 177, 184 N.E. 521 (1932) ; People v. Ruthenberg, 229 Mich. 315, 201
N.W. 358 (1924) ; People v. Steelik, 187 Cal. 361, 203 Pac. 78 (1921) ; State v. Laundy,
103 Ore. 443, 204 Pac. 958 (1922).
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Schenck v. United States.4 Although the continued application and util-
ity of the test is uncertain as a result of United States v. Dennis,"M it
seems that there should be some appreciable amount of inherent danger
upon which to base a criminal conviction for mere speech. If the states
are truly concerned for their existence and seek to prevent their over-
throw, some possibility of that end resulting from the defendant's con-
duct should be present.
Although the theory of dual prosecution by state and federal govern-
ments for the same conduct has long been settled,"6 it has continually met
with strong opposition founded upon the aversion of Americans toward
any circumvention of the constitutional guarantee against double jeop-
ardy.17 Moreover, there is the basic unfairness of the disparity of sen-
74. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The rule is, as defined by Justice Holmes: "The
question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." For later application, see Her-
don v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) ; Taylor
v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943). See generally, Antieau, The Rule of Clear and
Present Danger: Scope of Its Applicability, 48 MicH. L. REv. 811 (1950).
75. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The weight of the test was greatly diminished by the
Supreme Court's adoption of Judge Hand's interpretation which emphasized the gravity
of the evil rather than its imminence or the accused's ability to bring it about. United
States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 211 (2d Cir. 1950). This case has prompted a series of
articles, most of which maintain that it sounded the rule's death knell. Nathanson, The
Communist Trial and the Clear and Present Danger Test, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1167 (1950) ;
Boudin, Seditious Doctrines and the Clear and Present Danger Rule, 38 VA. L. REv. 143,
315 (1952) ; Gorfinkel and Mack, Dennis v. United States and the Clear and Present
Danger Rule, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 475 (1951) ; Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-
From Schenck to Dennis, 52 COLUm. L. REv. 313 (1952) ; Corwin, Bowing Out Clear
and Present Danger Rule, 27 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 325 (1952).
76. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922); Sexton v. California, 189 U.S.
319 (1903) ; California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
77. "As a matter of legal analysis there can be no doubt of the soundness of the
doctrine which allows concurrent or successive federal and state prosecutions for the
same act. But one cannot read the history of these concurrent prosecutions without be-
coming conscious that such two or even three-fold prosecutions (since in some cases
municipalities may prosecute also for the same act) have produced irritation and feel-
ings of injustice beyond any good they have accomplished. It is never wise to foster a
public feeling that law is something arbitrary and out of touch with justice." Address
by Roscoe Pound, delivered before California Bar Ass'n at Pasadena, Sept. 18, 1930.
See 17 A.B.A.J. 9, 14 (1931). See dissent of Justices Frankfurter and Burton in Cali-
fornia v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 738, 741 (1949) ; Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive
Prosecutions, 32 COLUm. L. REv. 1309 (1932) ; Note, 55 COLUm. L. REv. 83, 96 (1955).
But cf. State v. Kelly, - Fla. - , 76 S.2d 798 (1954); Nelson v. Wyman,
N.H. -, 102 A.2d 756 (1954) ; Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920) ; Halter v.
Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
Double jeopardy is not violated in the strict sense since it arises only when a person
is tried two times for the same crime by the same sovereign. If both the state and
federal governments have jurisdiction to act against the defendant, it follows that he is
not held in double jeopardy when each of the two sovereigns tries him once for the same
crime.
NOTES
tences between federal and states statutes." Harsh punishments meted
out by state-court juries may reflect the prejudicial tenor"0 of the prose-
cutions and point to "scare" legislation and a lack of judicial objectivity.
Since much of the state legislation in question was enacted at the
instigation of investigating bodies such as the Tenney Committee of Cali-
fornia, 0 jurists argue that constitutional and procedural guarantees were
scrapped in a sacrificial offering to swift and stringent prosecution. One
reason for invalidation of the sedition act involved in Commonwealth v.
Nelsoin' was that Pennsylvania procedure permits indictment on the in-
formation of a private individual. Hired-witness charges were often
heard during I.W.W. prosecutions in California during the early 1920's"I
and defendants under Minnesota's wartime sedition act could be arrested
without a warrant.8 3
Admitting the difficulty of drafting a statute in precise language to
deal with the type of conduct sedition typifies, some courts have, never-
theless, been too quick to reject appeals as to vagueness and indefiniteness
with bland assertions that the words of the statute are sufficiently ex-
plicit and have such commonly understood significance that the defendant
78. The average maximum punishment under the statutes cited in note 1 supra is
11.8 years. Nine states, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mon-
tana, Pennsylvania, and Texas, provide maximums of 20 years or more. Maximum
under the substantive section of the Smith Act (18 U.S.C. § 2385 (Supp. 1952) is 10
years, while the general conspiracy law (18 U.S.C. § 371 (Supp. 1952) carries a maxi-
mum of five years. An example may be seen by comparing the fate of the Dennis de-
fendants, all top-level communist leaders most of whom received five-year terms, with
that of Braden, infra note 91, alleged member of a five-man communist cell, who was
given a 15-year sentence.
79. For an argument that such harsh punishments may be cruel and unusual and
violative of the eighth amendment, see Belt, J., dissenting in State v. Boloff, 138 Ore.
568, 653, 4 P.2d 326 (1931).
In AM. Civ. LIB. UNION, A STRIKE Is CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM IN CALIFORNIA
(1931), the commander of the El Centro (Calif.) American Legion is quoted as saying:
"The way to kill the red plague is to dynamite it out. That's what we did in Imperial
County. The judge who tried the Communists was a Legionnaire; 50 per cent of thejurors were war veterans. What chance did the Communists have?" He was allegedly
speaking of convictions carrying sentences ranging up to 42 years affirmed in People v.
Horiuchi, 114 Cal. App. 415, 300 Pac. 457 (1931).
80. BARRETT, THE TENNY COMMITTEE (1951). Discussions of the Lusk Committee
in New York, Washington's Canwell Committee, and the Broyles Commission of Illi-
nois are found in GELLHORN, op. cit. supra note 4.
81. 277 Pa. 58, 74, 104 A.2d 133, 141 (1954).
82. Professional witnesses, themselves former I.W.W. members, seem to have tes-
tified in case after case to the same set of facts and confessions. People v. Powell, 71
Cal. App. 500, 236 Pac. 311 (1925) ; People v. Wright, 68 Cal. App. 621, 230 Pac. 221
(1924) ; People v. Cox, 66 Cal. App. 287, 226 Pac. 14 (1924) ; People v. Roe, 58 Cal.
App. 690, 209 Pac. 381 (1922).
83. Minn. Laws, 1917, c. 463. See CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 287.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
has been adequately warned of what is criminal."4 Such assertions pale
before statutory language making it unlawful to excite "ill feeling against
the United States,"8 to use "contemptuous language" against the United
States,8" "speech . . .which would incite any racial distrust,"' s "teach-
ings in sympathy with . . . institutions or forms of government hostile,
inimical, or antagonistic to those . . .of this state or the United States,"8 8
or to "suggest" overthrow by force and violence.8 "
It is also questionable whether states are administratively equipped
to try sedition cases. Recent prosecutions of alleged seditionists have been
based primarily on the subversive nature of the communist movement.
Few states staff any organization comparable to the F.B.I. The testi-
mony of that organization's operatives is normally needed to prove the
defendant a subversive." An average county prosecutor, aided by one or
two deputies, is hardly capable of preparing and presenting a case of this
magnitude without great assistance from federal agencies. While coop-
eration between state and federal police forces is to be encouraged, a
prosecution which is entirely dependent upon federal assistance should
not be brought in a state court.9'
84. State v. Boyd, 86 N.J.L. 75, 78, 91 Atl. 586, 587 (1914) ; State v. Sinchuck, 96
Conn. 605, 607, 115 Ati. 33, 34 (1921) ; State v. Workers' Socialist Publishing Co., 150
Minn. 406, 407, 185 N.W. 931, 932 (1921) ; People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23, 33, 136 N.E.
505, 511 (1922) ; People v. Ruthenberg, 229 Mich. 315, 324, 201 N.W. 358, 361 (1925) ;
Berg v. State, 29 Okla. Crim. 112, 117, 233 Pac. 497, 500 (1925). Contra, State v.
Klapprott, 127 N.J.L. 395, 22 A.2d 877 (1941) (reversed conviction because words
"hatred," "abuse," and "hostility" were abstract, indefinite; and unconstitutional as to the
spoken word. Id. at 402, 22 A.2d at 882.) State v. Diamond, 27 N.M. 477, 202 Pac. 988
(1921) (held sedition statute unconstitutional because it failed to proscribe how govern-
ment was to be overthrown.) The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, in State v.
Tachin, 92 N.J.L. 270, 106 Atl. 145 (1909) affirmed a statute similar to that in State v.
Diamond, supra, by reading into the act that the proscribed opposition or hostility would
include "subversion or destruction by force."
The United States Supreme Court, in Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915), up-
held the constitutionality of a statute punishing persons who publish matter "which shall
tend to encourage disrespect for law."
85. ALASKA Comp. LAWS ANN. § 65-11-1 (1949).
86. HAWAII REV. LAWS c. 236, § 11190 (1945).
87. MISS. CODE ANN. § 2402 (1942).
88. W. VA. CODE ANN . § 5912 (1955).
89. "Y. REV. STAT. § 432.030 (1953).
90. E.g., possible intereference with the F.B.I.'s program could have been caused
had Herbert A. Philbrick, whose undercover work was largely instrumental in convict-
ing the Dennis defendants, been forced two years earlier to testify in a state prosecution
of a communist underling.
91. Each of the foregoing objections to state prosecutions was clearly manifested
in the recent case of Commonwealth v. Braden, No. 101692, Jefferson Circuit Court
(Ky. 1954). Defendant sold a home in a White residential area in Louisville to a Negro
family. The house was later bombed and from a grand jury investigation of the blast
came the sedition indictment under which Braden was convicted, sentenced to 15 years
in prison, and fined $5,000. No proof was required of either any "clear and present
danger" or advocacy of the overthrow of the United States government or that of Ken-
NOTES
A withdrawal by the states from prosecution of sedition, whether it
be by Supreme Court mandate or by a realization of issues here raised, is
needed. 2 Passed in haste and with little legislative planning93 and en-
forced indiscriminately and arbitrarily in periods of war, hysteria, and
social unrest, state sedition statutes generally constitute a hindrance rather
than an aid in the search for compatibility between internal security,
personal liberty, and judicial integrity.
tucky. If guilty of sedition, the defendant is liable to indictment under the Smith Act.
It is noteworthy that the United States Attorney General, possessing knowledge of Bra-
den's alleged Communist party membership, has instituted no proceeding under the Smith
Act. The reason might be that there is insufficient evidence upon which to base a fed-
eral prosecution or that such action might interfere with nation-wide Communist sur-
veilance. The Commonwealth's evidence was almost entirely supplied by federal sources.
It consisted of general testimony on Communism by Velde Committee witnesses, intro-
duction of books and pamphlets from Braden's library, and the testimony of an F.B.I.
undercover witness that Braden was a Communist. In view of the circumstances, the
possibility cannot be ignored that Braden was not tried because he had committed sedi-
tion against the United States or Kentucky, but because he had flaunted the South's
racial code.
Another state sedition case of note still pending is that of Prof. Dirk Jan Struik of
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Commonwealth v. Gilbert, No. 40734, Middlesex
Superior Court (Mass. 1954), under MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 264, § 11 (Supp. 1954), un-
used since passage in 1919. Indictment was returned in 1951, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13,
1951, p. 23, col. 3. After a hearing on motion to quash (March 24, 1954), the trial court
reported the case to the Supreme Judicial Court, presenting questions of law including
whether the act and/or the indictment are violative of the first and fourteenth amend-
ments and whether the Smith Act has suspended application of the Massachusetts act.
See Report, Commonwealth v. Gilbert, szpra, p. 4. The Supreme Judicial Court has
made no decision, obviously awaiting a Supreme Court decision in Commonwealth v.
Nelson.
92. An investigation of the desirability of a uniform subversive activities act was
discussed in 1952 at a conference of Eastern Attorneys General. Neither the Council of
State Governments nor its Drafting Committee has ever been formally approached with
respect to the proposal. No record of any further work could be obtained. Letter from
Herbert L. Wiltsee, Southern Representative, Council of State Governments, to Indiana
Law Journal, Nov. 28, 1955.
93. The regrettable situation was best illustrated by Sen. John H. Dent, then mi-
nority leader in Pennsylvania's Senate, during debate on that state's Loyalty Act (PA.
STAT. AxN. tit. 65, §§ 212-225 (Supp. 1954). Recalling that when he had voted against
a 1945 measure taking Communists off the ballot, he ". . . was vindicated, because it
was declared unconstitutional, but all the newspapers and the people in my community,
who felt that they were doing what they thought was right, burned me in effigy upon
my front lawn and, although I was characterized as a Red and a near Red or 'pink' or
whatever you want to call it, there was never an apology made to my family, there was
never a word of retraction made after the bill was declared unconstitutional. So . . . in
the face of that injustice, in fairness to my family, I will vote for this legislation. . ..
We are living in a day when men will hide behind the decent emblem of patriotism to do
things that they would not do openly, but as a leader of my party, I must subscribe to
the days that we live in. . . . I will vote for this measure because the injustices of the
day demand me to vote for it." See Byse, A Report on the Pennsylvania Loyalty Act,
101 U. OF PA. L. REv. 480, 507 (1953).
